generosity in the gain frame, replicating our previous finding, while anterior insular cortex was Introduction 7 Vgain = 81 vs. median Vloss = 80; Z = 1.43, p = 0.15). These results held when excluding 203 participants with null discounting.
204
Overall these results suggest that, while generosity to socially close others was comparable 205 between frame conditions, it decayed significantly less steeply in the loss than in the gain 206 frame, indicating that participants were considerably more generous towards socially distant 207 others in the loss frame compared to the gain frame.
209
Neural mechanisms underlying the frame effect on social discounting 210 To obtain more substantial insights into the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying 211 this framing effect on social discounting, in study 4, we measured BOLD responses while 212 participants performed both frame variants of the social discounting task. The fundamental 213 premise of our study is that the decision motives and their neural correlates differ between 214 gain and loss frames. Specifically, we reasoned that generosity in the gain frame was mainly with activity in VMPFC (MNI peak coordinates at 2, 36, 22, pFWE-corr < 0.001) as well as in other prefrontal valuation regions ( Fig. 3 ; see Table S1 for a complete list of activations).
241
To test our second hypothesis, we aimed to replicate our previous finding of brain structures 242 known to represent vicarious reward value and overcoming egoism bias in the gain frame (5, 243 16). Our results (GLM2; see Materials and methods) indeed revealed clusters located in 244 VMPFC (0, 54, 14, pFWE-corr < 0.001) and caudate 16, 10, .02) to be selectively 245 activated when participants made generous choices in the gain frame relative to generous 246 choices in the loss frame. Additionally, a region of interest (ROI) analysis showed that right 247 TPJ (54, -60, 34, pFWE-corr < 0.02) was also activated in this contrast. Thus, consistent with (5, 248 43), a network comprising VMPFC and TPJ seems to underlie the motivation for costly 249 generosity in the gain frame ( Fig. 4 ; see Table S2 for a complete list of activations).
250
Our third hypothesis predicted that generosity in the loss frame is motivated by social norm 251 compliance rather than other-regarding considerations; generosity would, consequently, go 252 along with a different activation pattern in the loss than the gain frame. Accordingly, the right 253 anterior insula (42, 4, -4 , ROI analysis, pFWE-corr < 0.02; GLM2, see Materials and methods),
254
was selectively activated during generous choices in the loss frame relative to generous 255 choices in the gain frame, thus in the reverse contrast than the one used to test our second 256 hypothesis ( Fig. 5a ; see Table S2 for a complete list of activations).
257
To further illustrate this result, we quantified the extent at which insula activation correlated 258 with the individual propensity to make generous choices in the gain and the loss frame. To this 259 end, we extracted the parameter estimates at the individual level from an ROI with a seed in 260 the anterior insula (coordinates obtained from the results of GLM2, see above [42, 4, -4] ).
261
Parameter estimates were extracted separately for the gain and the loss frame, after pooling 262 all choices within each frame (GLM3; see Materials and methods). We then correlated, for 263 each frame separately, the extracted betas with the percentage of generous choices in the 264 respective frame. While insula activation did not significantly covary with generous choices in 265 the gain frame (r = -0.01, p = 0.48; Fig. 5b ), it did correlate positively with generous choices in 266 the loss frame (r = 0.034, p = 0.03, one-tailed, dCohen = 0.72; Fig. 5c ), thus corroborating the 267 idea that anterior insula played a different role in promoting generosity in the loss than in the 268 gain frame.
269
Our analysis so far suggests that insula activation reflects the psychological motives underlying 270 generous choice in the loss frame. However, other explanations of our insula finding are 271 conceivable, too. For instance, participants made more generous choices overall in the loss 272 than the gain frame; i.e., they forewent more own-payoff in the loss-than the gain-frame, and during generous choices in either frame condition. Additionally, insula activity is unlikely to reflect the own-reward component of the generous alternative because it was fixed (always individuals' willingness to costly support socially remote others. We adapted a social 285 discounting task where participants chose between a selfish optiona high gain to the self 286 and zero-gain to the otherand a generous optiona lower gain to the self and equal gain 287 to the other (5, 16) . Based on previous evidence that people are strongly reluctant to increase 288 their own payoff at the expense of others' welfare (27-30), we framed the generous option 289 either as a monetary gain to the other (gain frame), or as the prevention of the loss of a 290 previous monetary endowment to the other (loss frame) (see (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 31) ). Crucially, between 291 frames, the choice alternatives differed only in the description of the decision problem, but not 292 with regard to their actual economic consequences. In a series of four studies, we show that 293 the social discount function was significantly flatter in the loss-than the gain-frame, indicating 294 that participants were more generous towards socially remote others if a personal gain implied 295 the other's loss of their previous endowment. Notably, our incentivization procedure made it 296 logically impossible for the other person to know about her endowment, or the potential loss of 297 it, and participants were explicitly instructed about this; all that mattered was the final positive 298 payoff to self and others. Yet, the fact that our participants were still reluctant to inflict losses 299 to others suggests that they had internalized the social norm of not taking away money from 300 others to such a degree that it prevailed even in the absence of any real economic 301 consequences for others.
302
We further hypothesized that the frame-dependent motives underlying generosity are 303 dissociable on the neural level. Consistent with our previous work (5, 16), we found that 304 generosity in the gain frame recruited a network of structures, including VMPFC and TPJ, 305 known to represent vicarious reward value and overcoming egoism bias. By contrast, in the 306 loss frame, we expected that the reluctance to maximize own-gain at the expense of a loss to 307 others would be mediated by social norm compliance and associated social sentiments. We 308 therefore hypothesized that increased activity in brain regions associated with such social 309 sentiments, specifically the insular cortex, would be associated with generous choice in the 310 loss frame specifically (22, 35, 47, 49-55, 36-42, 46) . We indeed found that the anterior insula across trials correlated with the individual propensity to make generous choices in the loss, 314 but not the gain frame. Overall, these results call for the idea that the difference in generosity 315 between frames is one of kind, and not of degree, that is, that the mental processes behind 316 generosity are likely qualitatively different in the gain and the loss frame.
317
Our findings expand on previous evidence that preventing harm to others is a great motivator 318 of prosocial performance (19, (22) (23) (24) 56) . However, while others have found that harm 319 prevention was particularly pronounced in a public context (19) and dependent on social 320 feedback (20, 21), we show that similar cognitive mechanisms can strongly boost generosity 321 even in a private context and in the absence of social feedback, thus independent of 322 reputational concerns, judgment by social peers, or third-party punishment threats. This 323 suggests that other-harm prevention might be an internalized motive that works unconditionally 324 and universally across contexts, regardless of social consequences. In addition, previous 325 experiments on harm prevention did not manipulate, or provide information on, social distance 326 between donor and recipient (19, 23, 25, 26, 30) . Hence, while the effects of the resource 327 allocation mode on social discounting were elusive so far, our findings imply that it matters:
328 harm-prevention motives in the loss frame were less dependent on social distance than other-329 regarding considerations in the gain frame, thus resulting in flatter social discounting.
330
Our results are consistent with the idea that certain costly altruistic behaviors are not motivated 331 by genuinely other-regarding considerations, but instead by compliance to internalized social 332 norms. But what impels participants to comply to social norms? Here, we propose, along with 333 the evidence in (28), that compliance to social normstransgression of which, in the present 334 experiment, is attached to the act of inflicting the loss of the other person's initial endowment 335 if a selfish choice is made in the loss framemight be linked to anticipated feelings of guilt, 336 shame, and remorse, and accompanying insula activation (see also (57, 58) ), which ultimately 337 sustain prosocial behavior.
338
In conclusion, we present a simple behavioral framing manipulation that boosts generosity 339 towards socially remote others: framing a selfish choice as a loss to others can result in a 340 negative affective state, eventually motivating prosocial behavior, even if the framing of the 341 choice options is irrelevant for the actual payoff to others. Our neuroimaging data identify insula 342 as the core component in processing loss prevention motives, prompting generosity by biasing 343 people away from selfish desires if these caused harm to others, including strangers. Our 344 results imply that prosocial attitudes towards others are highly malleable and strongly depend 345 on the architecture of the decision problem. The insights gained in this study might, thus, help 346 in designing policies aimed at increasing the acceptance and support of the principle of a Participants between €500 and €999, five between €1000 and €1499, one between €1599 and €1999, and were always indicated in yellow. Participants indicated their choice of the selfish or the generous alternative by a left or right button press. In the loss frame (Fig. 1B) , participants were informed, after the social distance presentation, generous alternative (right in Fig. 1B) 
433
In addition to the framing (gain frame, loss frame) and the social distance levels of the other 434 (1, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100) , in each condition, we manipulated the magnitude of the own-reward 435 across trials: we used nine selfish reward amounts per frame condition, ranging from €75 to generous alternative invariantly yielded an equal €75/€75 split between participant and other 441 person. In the loss frame condition, the other-endowment was always €75, the selfish 442 alternative yielded a variable own-reward accompanied by the loss of the €75 endowment to 443 the other, and the generous alternative always yielded €75 own-reward and had no financial 444 consequences for the other, i.e., she could keep her initial endowment of €75.
445
To summarize the logic of the task, both frames were mathematically equivalent, i.e., they 
453
The order of frame conditions, selfish-reward presentations, as well as the left or right screen-454 position of the selfish and generous alternative were randomized and counterbalanced across 455 trials. The task of studies 1-3 had a total of 108 self-paced trials. The task of study 4 had a 456 total of 216 trials as each trial type was repeated twice to allow for full left/right position selfish amount 155generous amount 75). All behavioral analyses were run in Statistica 12 participants included in the final sample were not repaired. However, we modeled these bad Furthermore, a third GLM (GLM3) that included an unmodulated regressor of all choices (pooled across generous and selfish) made in the loss frame and an unmodulated regressor coordinate-based meta-analysis of BOLD fMRI experiments examining neural correlates of subjective value. Neuroimage 76:412-427.
34.
Tusche 
828
uncorrected, minimum cluster size ≥ 5). Parameter estimates of insula activation [42, 4, -4] 829 were extracted separately for the gain and the loss frame, after pooling all choices (i.e., both 830 generous and selfish) within each frame. Insula activation did not correlate significantly with 831 the percentage of generous choices made in the gain frame (b) but in the loss frame (c) only. 
Supplemental materials and methods

Studies 1-3
was flatter in the loss frame than the gain frame. The same pattern of results was found in of the relationship of the participants to the respective people assigned to the various social 942 distance levels. As social distance (SD) 1, ten participants indicated their mother/father, nine 943 indicated their sibling, seven indicated their partner/husband/wife/fiancé(e), three indicated a 944 close friend (non-sexual), and one defined the relationship to SD1 as 'other' (i.e., not included 945 in the given options). We further asked participants to indicate their relationship with the person 946 on SD 1 on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 7 = definitely yes). Participants rated item 1 ("I 947 feel very close to (person at SD1)") with an average score of 6.0 (±1.9 standard deviation), 948 item 2 ("In general, I have a very good relation with (person at SD1)") with 6.3 (±1.7), and item 949 3 ("I am very familiar with (person at SD1)") with 6.0 (±1.9).
950
As SD5, eighteen participants indicated a close friend (non-sexual), four indicated their Table S1 . Activations at selfish choice onset (button press), pooled across loss and 994 gain frame. Significant clusters active at p < 0.001 (unc.), whole-brain cluster-level-corrected Table S2 . Activations at generous choice onset (button press). Significant clusters active 997 at p < 0.001 (unc.), whole-brain cluster-level-corrected pFWE-corr < 0.05. R = right; L = left;
